Summary of Political, Economic, and Military Division of Europe

From Wikibooks, open books for an open world
Jump to: navigation, search

The Breakdown of the Grand Alliance[edit]

Step One: The Wartime Conferences[edit]

The Tehran Conference (1943)[edit]

The Yalta Conference (1945)[edit]

  • State of the war: Germany on verge of being defeated, the Second Front had been opened by 1944, Japan under heavy aerial bombardment from the Americans as the Americans held control of air and sea in the pacific.
  • Germany: Decided that she would be disarmed, demilitarised, de-Nazified, and divided. Four "temporary" zones of occupation would be created, and Stalin demanded 50% of the $20 billion reparations that Germany had to pay.
  • Poland: New frontiers were decided, at the Cruzon Line where had been before in Russo-Polish War (1921). Gained territory from Germany, giving Stalin what he wanted (territorially), thus allowing Poland to hold "free elections" with a more democratic government. However, Britain and Russia supported two different parties: 'London Poles,' and communist-led 'Lublin Committee'.
  • Eastern Europe: Stalin said these countries would be able to decide with "free elections," was a major victory for US and Britain.
  • Japan: Stalin promised to join the war, but demanded reward territory. These terms were accepted.
  • United Nations: Stalin agreed to join the UN, and gave the power to veto to five permanent members. Stalin wanted all 16 Soviet Republics to have separate seats in UN General Assembly, but only 3 were given; Russia, Ukraine, Belarus.
  • Conclusion: Agreement over the UN, Soviets agreed to join the war in the Pacific, the Big There signed the "Declaration for Liberated Europe", pledging free elections in Eastern Europe.

What were the crucial developments that took place between the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences?[edit]

The Potsdam Conference (1945)[edit]

Key developments (1946−47)[edit]

Salami tactics[edit]

Targeting instability in Greece and Turkey[edit]

Community parties in Italy and France[edit]

Step Two: Kennan's long telegram (February 1946)[edit]

  • Written by US diplomat George F. Kennan to the U.S. State Department on the nature of Soviet conduct, and helped hard US attitudes towards containment.
  • The USSR's view of the world was a traditional one of insecurity,
  • The Soviets wanted to advance Muscovite Stalinist ideology (not simply 'Marxism'),
  • The Soviet regime was cruel and repressive and justified this by perceiving nothing but evil in the outside world. That view of a hostile outside environment would sustain the internal Stalinist system, and
  • The USSR was fanatically hostile to the West − but they were not 'suicidal ... impervious to the logic of reason Moscow [was] highly sensitive to the logic of force.'