Canadian Refugee Procedure/Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding

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Contents

Relevant Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulation Provisions[edit]

Rule 54 operates against the background of section 159.9 of the regulations:

Hearing Before Refugee Protection Division

Time limits for hearing
159.9 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), for the purpose of subsection 100(4.1) of the Act, the date fixed for the hearing before the Refugee Protection Division must be not later than
(a) in the case of a claimant referred to in subsection 111.1(2) of the Act,
(i) 30 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, if the claim is made inside Canada other than at a port of entry, and
(ii) 45 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, if the claim is made inside Canada at a port of entry; and
(b) in the case of any other claimant, 60 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, whether the claim is made inside Canada at a port of entry or inside Canada other than at a port of entry.

Exclusion
(2) If the time limit set out in subparagraph (1)(a)(i) or (ii) or paragraph (1)(b) ends on a Saturday, that time limit is extended to the next working day.

Exceptions
(3) If the hearing cannot be held within the time limit set out in subparagraph (1)(a)(i) or (ii) or paragraph (1)(b) for any of the following reasons, the hearing must be held as soon as feasible after that time limit:
(a) for reasons of fairness and natural justice;
(b) because of a pending investigation or inquiry relating to any of sections 34 to 37 of the Act; or
(c) because of operational limitations of the Refugee Protection Division.

What is a pending investigation or inquiry relating to sections 34 to 37 of the Act?[edit]

The sections of the Act referred to in Regulation section 159.9(3)(b) are those at Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss. 34-37 <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec33> retrieved on 2020-01-17. The provisions in question are lengthy and verbose, and for that reason, they are not reproduced here. The Board has a policy which guides its actions to await such inquiries, the Instructions Governing the Management of Refugee Protection Claims Awaiting Front-End Security Screening. The instructions read as follows:

In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received in time for the initially scheduled hearing, the IRB will remove the hearing from the schedule and set a new date and time for the hearing as soon as feasible upon confirmation of the security screening. Parties will be advised in accordance with the process outlined in Notification.

In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received at six (6) months from the date of referral, the RPD will normally proceed to schedule and hear the claim unless the CBSA files an application change the date and time that is granted by the IRB. In considering such an application, the RPD will provide an opportunity to the claimant to make representations.

In those cases where the IRB grants a delay and confirmation of security screening is subsequently received, it will be rescheduled as soon as feasible.

In cases where confirmation of security screening remains pending at twelve (12) months from the date of referral, the RPD will convene a conference with the claimant, counsel and Minister’s counsel and may fix a date for a hearing.[1]

Comparison of the interpretation of the different exceptions to the mandatory timelines[edit]

If found eligible, a hearing date will be set within 30 days for claimants from a designated country of origin, and within 60 days for others. These timelines are set out in s.159.9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations and they are mandatory. The section sets out the situations in which there may not be compliance with the timelines:

(a) for reasons of fairness and natural justice;

(b) because of a pending investigation or inquiry relating to any of sections 34 to 37 of the Act; or

(c) because of operational limitations of the Refugee Protection Division.

While the Board appears to be taking a very restrictive view of timelines set out in s.159.9(1)(a) of IRPR (see commentary on Rule 54), the BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre has noted that the Board’s interpretation of 159.9(1)(b) is much more liberal,[2] and there is a broad policy of accommodating time for the Minister to engage in initial security screening. The Minister does not need to apply for more time, as the Board will not proceed with a hearing in the first six months if the Minister has not provided confirmation that front end security screening is complete:

In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received in time for the initially scheduled hearing, the IRB will remove the hearing from the schedule and set a new date and time for the hearing as soon as feasible upon confirmation of the security screening. ... In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received at six (6) months from the date of referral, the RPD will normally proceed to schedule and hear the claim unless the CBSA files an application to change the date and time that is granted by the IRB.[3]

In Alhaqli v. Canada the court was asked to consider this issue. In that case, the applicants submitted that the Board's process of automatically postponing hearings where FESS has not been completed breaches procedural fairness because the policy gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias by granting the Minister a cancellation of a refugee hearing without following the procedures for the scheduling and postponement of refugee claims as provided in the IRPA, Regulations, and Rules. As a result, the claimants argued that the Minister is provided preferential treatment via an automatic postponement whenever the CBSA has not performed its statutory duties in accordance with the prescribed time-frames, because the Minister neither has to establish that the legislative and regulatory criteria for a postponement have been satisfied nor move for the relief sought.[4] In that case, the court declined to rule on the issue, holding that the matter as raised was moot.

Priority scheduling for unaccompanied minor claimants[edit]

A 2019 audit of the system by the Auditor General found that the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada was able to prioritize protection decisions for unaccompanied minors. For the 628 claims made by unaccompanied minors over our audit period, most had hearings within 60 days and received protection decisions an average of two months earlier than other claims.[5]

How often hearings are postponed[edit]

In a 2019 audit of the refugee system, the Auditor General concluded that about 65% of hearings were postponed at least once before a decision was made.[6] These are the reasons for the postponements:

Reasons for postponed hearings Percentage of postponed hearings
Board member unavailable (operational limitations) 49%
Claimant or claimant’s counsel unavailable 14%
Security screening results still pending 10%
Lack of time to complete a hearing 6%
Need to hear family members’ claims together or separately 5%
Waiting for documents or late disclosure of documents 4%
Interpreter unavailable 3%
Other 9%

The Board's actions on its own motion (ex proprio motu)[edit]

Rule 54 concerns applications from parties to change the date or time of a proceeding. The Board also has the power to act on its own motion to reschedule a matter, which is referred to as its power to act ex proprio motu. In exercising such discretion, panels of the Board should considered any applicable guidelines issued by the Chairperson of the Board. The Chairperson is empowered to issue written guidelines on any matter within his or her purview, including the procedure to be followed by the RPD in fixing the time of a hearing: ss. 159(1)(h) and 159(1)(f) of the IRPA:

Chairperson
159 (1) The Chairperson is, by virtue of holding that office, a member of each Division of the Board and is the chief executive officer of the Board. In that capacity, the Chairperson
(f) apportions work among the members of the Board and fixes the place, date and time of proceedings;
(h) may issue guidelines in writing to members of the Board and identify decisions of the Board as jurisprudential guides, after consulting with the Deputy Chairpersons, to assist members in carrying out their duties;

Rule 54(1)-(3) - Process for making an application to change the date or time of a proceeding[edit]

The text of the relevant rule reads:

Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding

Application in writing
54 (1) Subject to subrule (5), an application to change the date or time of a proceeding must be made in accordance with rule 50, but the party is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.

Time limit and content of application
(2) The application must
(a) be made without delay;
(b) be received by the Division no later than three working days before the date fixed for the proceeding, unless the application is made for medical reasons or other emergencies; and
(c) include at least three dates and times, which are no later than 10 working days after the date originally fixed for the proceeding, on which the party is available to start or continue the proceeding.

Oral application
(3) If it is not possible for the party to make the application in accordance with paragraph (2)(b), the party must appear on the date fixed for the proceeding and make the application orally before the time fixed for the proceeding.

Commentary[edit]

Terminology about adjournments and postponements[edit]

The terminology of this rule is that the Board is entertaining and application to change the date and time of the proceeding. Nonetheless, many terms borrowed from court proceedings seep into such decisions. For example, postponements (changing the date of a hearing prior to any evidence being heard), adjournment (adding a new day to a proceeding once some evidence has been heard), and recesses (a break in the proceeding).[7]

Roles of Board, parties, and Minister's officers in scheduling[edit]

The roles of officers for CBSA and IRCC, counsel for the parties, and the ability of the Board to reschedule on its own motion are discussed at the following commentary regarding Rule 3, which concerns initial scheduling decisions: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Roles of officers, parties, and Board in scheduling matters.

Time limit for the written application[edit]

As per Rule 54(1), such applications are to be made in accordance with rule 50, which requires that they be made in writing. As per Rule 54(2)(b), such applications must be received by the Division no later than three working days before the date fixed for the proceeding. According to 54(3) and 54(2)(b) of the Rules, applications after this date should be made orally at the hearing, not in writing. While it may be a best practice to make such applications in writing in an event, even if one or two days prior to the hearing, parties cannot count on the Board receiving the application prior to the hearing.

When an oral application is allowed at the hearing[edit]

According to Rule 2(b), an application may be made orally at the hearing where there is a medical reason "or other emergency" which is the cause of the application. As the Court stated in Guylas v. Canada, this exception to the requirement to apply in writing applies where the party "could not have applied without unreasonable effort".[8]

  • Recent change in counsel necessitated by prior counsel incompetence? In Freeman v. Canada, the claimant's grounds for an adjournment was a recent change in counsel, allegedly as a result of the incompetence of prior counsel, which necessitated witness preparation and the additional filing of documents. The court held in that case that this does not constitute a medical or other emergency which would warrant an oral application for an adjournment. As such, the request for an adjournment was not properly before the Board.[9]

History of requirement to provide 3 dates and times when the party is available[edit]

A draft of this rule originally required counsel to provide three days when they would be available within five days of the original hearing. This requirement was modified as a result of stakeholder feedback: "Several respondents expressed concern regarding the tight timelines in the rule pertaining to an application for a change of date or time of a proceeding. The rule required that the claimant, when requesting a change of date or time, provide three days on which they would be available to proceed which fall within five working days after the date originally fixed for the proceeding. Respondents felt that this was unrealistic, particularly given the anticipated busy schedules of counsel." Noting this concern along with the overall scheme of the IRPA and the IRPR as well as the scheme of the RPD Rules, the IRB has changed the rule such that claimants provide three dates within a window of ten working days. Similarly, the rules state that the new date fixed by the Division must be no later than ten working days, or as soon as possible thereafter.[10]

That said, despite the requirement that counsel provide such dates, it is rare that a hearing that is being rescheduled will be rescheduled within 10 days of the old date. According to a 2019 Auditor General report, fewer than 10% of hearings where the date or time was changed were rescheduled within this 10-day timeframe. The Board's schedule is generally fully booked for at least three months ahead. As a result, when a claim is postponed the usual delay is of several months.[6]

Rule 54(4) - Factors to consider[edit]

Factors
(4) Subject to subrule (5), the Division must not allow the application unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as
(a) the change is required to accommodate a vulnerable person; or
(b) an emergency or other development outside the party’s control and the party has acted diligently.

Commentary[edit]

History of this provision[edit]

The old RPD Rules required the RPD to consider numerous factors in deciding whether to grant a change of date or time.[11] Specifically, section 48 of the RPD Rules set out eleven factors that were to be considered in dealing with a request to change the time of the hearing:

(a) in the case of a date and time that was fixed after the Division consulted or tried to consult the party, any exceptional circumstances for allowing the application;

(b) when the party made the application;

(c) the time the party has had to prepare for the proceeding;

(d) the efforts made by the party to be ready to start or continue the proceeding;

(e) in the case of a party who wants more time to obtain information in support of the party’s arguments, the ability of the Division to proceed in the absence of that information without causing an injustice;

(f) whether the party has counsel;

(g) the knowledge and experience of any counsel who represents the party;

(h) any previous delays and the reasons for them;

(i) whether the date and time fixed were peremptory;

(j) whether allowing the application would unreasonably delay the proceedings or likely cause an injustice; and

(k) the nature and complexity of the matter to be heard.[12]

However, the current Rules, last amended on December 15, 2012, do not include that list of factors. Instead, as set out above, the Rules provide that the RPD must not change the date or time unless there are exceptional circumstances.

In principle, how should the Board determine whether there are exceptional circumstances which justify rescheduling a matter?[edit]

The Federal Court has commented in Tung v. Canada that in exercising its discretion to reschedule a case, the Board must generally take into account all relevant factors. This will include the exceptional circumstances listed in Rule 54(4) (accommodating a vulnerable person or an emergency or other development outside of a party's control where the party has acted diligently). Furthermore, the Board may consider the factors from Siloch v. Canada:

  • whether the applicant has done everything in her power to be represented by counsel;
  • the number of previous adjournments granted, including any peremptory adjournments;
  • the duration of the requested adjournment;
  • the effect on the immigration system;
  • whether needless delay would result; and
  • whether the applicant is to blame.

This above Siloch v. Canada[13] factors are still considered to be good law despite the fact that the case pre-dates the changes made to the RPD Rules in 2012.[14] Where the Board fails to take into account relevant factors cited above and refuses an adjournment request, it will have acted unreasonably.[15] This is the case even where the Board considers a claimant's vulnerability or whether there was an emergency beyond a party's control. As the court notes in Tung v. Canada, the latter are merely examples of exceptional circumstances, not an exhaustive definition of all relevant exceptional circumstances. In that case, the Federal Court concluded that the Board had erred because it "appeared not to consider whether Ms Tung’s personal situation amounted to exceptional circumstances in the broader sense."[15] That said, the above factors need not take on a check-list quality: the Federal Court of Appeal has rejected the argument that the factors in Siloch must be considered whenever a party requests an adjournment, it being a non-exhaustive list of the sorts of factors a judge deciding the case may find useful to consider.[16]

What exceptional circumstances have, and have not, been found to justify an application to change a date and time?[edit]

Situations involving vulnerable persons[edit]

Rule 54(4)(a) provides that the Division must not allow an application to reschedule a hearing unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as the change being required to accommodate a vulnerable person. "Vulnerable person" is a defined term in the rules, and it "means a person who has been identified as vulnerable under the Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB issued under paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Act." As such, the term "vulnerable person" should be used consistently throughout this regime. What should be considered when determining whether a claimant's vulnerability constitutes an exceptional circumstances justifying the rescheduling of a proceeding? The following are some factors that emerge from past decisions:

  • Absence of representation: The RAD has noted that the guiding principal is that the RPD has an obligation to ensure a fair proceeding, especially where refugee claimants are without representation and suffering from apparent mental health issues.[17] As noted by the Federal Court, the right to counsel is important and can be a determinative factor in the outcome of these decisions, particularly where there is some sense that the applicants are vulnerable: "The failure to have counsel present at the hearing generally leaves the clients at a serious disadvantage when new issues arise, or where the RPD member asks a question that would normally give rise to reply questions by counsel to elucidate a matter."[18]
  • Lack of sophistication: In one case, the RAD held that the RPD had erred in refused an adjournment request from an unrepresented claimant who was unprepared as of the date of the hearing, had been hospitalized for several days prior to the refugee hearing as a result of mental-health issues, and, in the RAD's words, was "clearly unsophisticated as to the appropriate CDT procedures".[17]
  • Inability to speak English or French: As noted by the Federal Court, a factor to be considered in such assessments is a claimant's ability in the official language of the proceeding: "In this matter, the applicants were not conversant in English and there appear to have been some issues with respect to the quality of the interpretation".[18] The BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, in a report on the refugee system, observes that "The ability of a claimant to effectively review hundreds of pages of detailed country condition documentation is often very limited, even in cases where they can read English."[19]
  • Past trauma: As the BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre notes in a report, many refugee claimants have experienced severe trauma before arriving in Canada. Some have survived or witnessed torture, killing and other forms of inhumanity. Many live with mental or physical disabilities, often linked to past persecution in the form of injuries or psychological scars that manifest in conditions like post- traumatic stress disorder. They write that "these challenges make it incredibly difficult for some claimants to be able to tell their story in a coherent way and to remain engaged in the system without assistance. Collecting documents, filling out forms, and providing testimony at a hearing are very difficult for many claimants."[20]
  • Detained persons: The BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre notes that being detained is a significant barrier to accessing legal representation and preparing for one's claim.[21]
  • Mental health challenges: Persons who are deeply depressed, suicidal, experiencing ongoing psychological impacts of trauma, and experiencing other mental health issues may justifiably argue that their ability to prepare for their hearing was impeded by such issues.[22] In appropriate cases, this may justify changing the date of their hearing and providing them with additional time to prepare their claim.

Situations involving emergencies and other developments outside of a party's control[edit]

Rule 54(4)(b) provides that the Division must not allow an application to reschedule a hearing unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as an emergency or other development outside the party’s control and the party has acted diligently. How has this been considered in past decisions?

  • A recent change of counsel, incompetency of old: A recent change of counsel, required by alleged incompetence, which necessitated witness preparation and the filing of further documents does not constitute an emergency: Freeman v. Canada.[23]\
  • Legislative changes potentially rendering a claimant ineligible: As a result of legislative changes which render claimants ineligible where they have previously made a claim in another country, the Minister is obliged to determine the eligibility of many claimants who have previously been referred to the Board. This legislative change has generally been accepted as a development outside of the Minister's control.

Assessments of whether a party has acted diligently[edit]

  • Inability to obtain counsel at an earlier date for financial reasons: An issue that arises with some regularity is where a claimant lacks money to have counsel represent them and then secures counsel at a late stage in the proceeding. The court commented on one such situation and concluded that it was consistent with a claimant have acted with due diligence as follows: "The male applicant outlined his problems with obtaining funding. I am satisfied that the applicants were acting in good faith at all times – they understood their disadvantage in not being represented and made diligent attempts to obtain counsel. They finally succeeded at the last moment, but given the short time-frame, their lawyer explained the situation to the RPD and requested a short postponement to allow him to represent the applicants."[24]

Other exceptional circumstances[edit]

The courts have made the following comments that relate to the above Siloch factors:

  • whether the applicant has done everything in her power to be represented by counsel;
  • the number of previous adjournments granted, including any peremptory adjournments;
  • the duration of the requested adjournment: The Court has commented that when there is some question about the duration that has been requested, one option for the Board is that "any dates that were available could have been stipulated by the RPD on a take-it-or-leave-it basis".[24]
  • the effect on the immigration system: In overturning decisions, the court has commented that "There is no indication on the record that the RPD could not have accommodated a postponement to the proposed dates or that any other operational considerations would have prevented the case from being reassigned to another date."[24]
  • whether needless delay would result; and
  • whether the applicant is to blame.
  • when the party made the application;
  • the time the party has had to prepare for the proceeding;
  • the efforts made by the party to be ready to start or continue the proceeding:
  • in the case of a party who wants more time to obtain information in support of the party’s arguments, the ability of the Division to proceed in the absence of that information without causing an injustice;
  • whether the party has counsel;
  • the knowledge and experience of any counsel who represents the party:
    • Timing of retainer: The timing of obtaining counsel is important in considering the knowledge that that counsel will have related to the file in question. If counsel is retained too late to be able to work effectively on a claimant’s case, then access to counsel has not been meaningful.[25]
    • Experience of counsel: The quality of counsel is also important. Simply being able to retain a lawyer who has little or no experience in refugee law is not proper access to counsel in the context of a refugee claim with extremely high stakes for the claimant.[25]
  • any previous delays and the reasons for them;
  • whether the date and time fixed were peremptory;
  • whether allowing the application would unreasonably delay the proceedings or likely cause an injustice; and
  • the nature and complexity of the matter to be heard: In some cases claimants will face possible exclusion from refugee protection due to status in a third country, or because of the alleged commission of serious crimes. The application of the exclusion provisions has been described as "often complex and involving a substantial and changing body of law".[20] This may properly point towards allowing a request to reschedule a matter.

Rule 54(5) - Counsel retained or availability of counsel provided after hearing date fixed[edit]

Counsel retained or availability of counsel provided after hearing date fixed
(5) If, at the time the officer fixed the hearing date under subrule 3(1), a claimant did not have counsel or was unable to provide the dates when their counsel would be available to attend a hearing, the claimant may make an application to change the date or time of the hearing. Subject to operational limitations, the Division must allow the application if
(a) the claimant retains counsel no later than five working days after the day on which the hearing date was fixed by the officer;
(b) the counsel retained is not available on the date fixed for the hearing;
(c) the application is made in writing;
(d) the application is made without delay and no later than five working days after the day on which the hearing date was fixed by the officer; and
(e) the claimant provides at least three dates and times when counsel is available, which are within the time limits set out in the Regulations for the hearing of the claim.

Commentary[edit]

Subrule 54(5) sets out circumstances where an adjournment is mandatory, does not restrict the Board's ability to otherwise grant adjournments[edit]

This rule sets out circumstances where the Board must grant an adjournment under that provision. Where those circumstances do not exist, the Board nonetheless has the discretion to grant an adjournment where the applicant’s personal situation warrants it.[26]

Chairperson's guidelines[edit]

In Guylas v. Canada, the Member commented "if [a new] lawyer picks up a file he has to be ready to go at the hearing. Yours wasn’t. So you have to go ahead [in the absence of counsel]." The court held that this was a misstatement of the law and rules on point.[27]

Rule 54(6)-(8) - Medical Reasons[edit]

Application for medical reasons
(6) If a claimant or protected person makes the application for medical reasons, other than those related to their counsel, they must provide, together with the application, a legible, recently dated medical certificate signed by a qualified medical practitioner whose name and address are printed or stamped on the certificate. A claimant or protected person who has provided a copy of the certificate to the Division must provide the original document to the Division without delay.

Content of certificate
(7) The medical certificate must set out
(a) the particulars of the medical condition, without specifying the diagnosis, that prevent the claimant or protected person from participating in the proceeding on the date fixed for the proceeding; and
(b) the date on which the claimant or protected person is expected to be able to participate in the proceeding.

Failure to provide medical certificate
(8) If a claimant or protected person fails to provide a medical certificate in accordance with subrules (6) and (7), they must include in their application
(a) particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate, supported by corroborating evidence;
(b) particulars of the medical reasons for the application, supported by corroborating evidence; and
(c) an explanation of how the medical condition prevents them from participating in the proceeding on the date fixed for the proceeding.

Commentary[edit]

Rule 54(9)-(10) - Subsequent applications and duty to appear[edit]

Subsequent application
(9) If the party made a previous application that was denied, the Division must consider the reasons for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.

Duty to appear
(10) Unless a party receives a decision from the Division allowing the application, the party must appear for the proceeding at the date and time fixed and be ready to start or continue the proceeding.

Commentary[edit]

The guiding principle, as noted in Mohammed v. Canada, is that the exercise of discretion has been severely limited under the revised RPD Rules, with strict timelines in place required to obtain an order changing the date or time of proceeding.[28]

Rule 54(11) - Scheduling the new date[edit]

New date
(11) If an application for a change to the date or time of a proceeding is allowed, the new date fixed by the Division must be no later than 10 working days after the date originally fixed for the proceeding or as soon as possible after that date.

Commentary[edit]

The courts have held that fundamental justice does not provide for a specific amount of time within which to prepare for a hearing.[29] The phrase "as soon as possible after that date" has a specific meaning in the refugee law context considering the history of changes to the IRPA. Section 48(2) of the Act mandates that "If a removal order is enforceable, ... the order must be enforced as soon as possible." The phrase “as soon as possible” used in that portion of the Act replaced the previous version of the statute in which the phrase read “as soon as is reasonably practicable.” As such, where the phrase "as soon as possible" is used in this regime, as it is here, it connotes a different, and arguably stronger, obligation than that connoted by the phrase "reasonably practicable".[30]

References[edit]

  1. Alhaqli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 728 (CanLII), para. 62.
  2. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 15.
  3. Instructions Governing the Management of Refugee Protection Claims Awaiting Front-end Security Screening <http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/instructions/Pages/InstructSecurit.aspx> (accessed Jan 7, 2015).
  4. Alhaqli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 728 (CanLII), para. 30.
  5. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Processing of Asylum Claims, Spring 2019 <https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201905_02_e_43339.html> (Accessed January 19, 2020).
  6. a b Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Processing of Asylum Claims, Spring 2019 <https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201905_02_e_43339.html> (Accessed January 19, 2020).
  7. Jorda v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 77324 (CA IRB), para. 6.
  8. Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 34.
  9. Freeman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 682 (CanLII), para. 24.
  10. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, Accessed January 3, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx>.
  11. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 95397 (CA IRB), paras. 21-22 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2014/2014canlii95397/2014canlii95397.html>.
  12. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, Rule 48.
  13. Siloch v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 10.
  14. Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1296 (CanLII), para. 6.
  15. a b Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1296 (CanLII), para. 7.
  16. Montana v. Canada (National Revenue), 2017 FCA 194 (CanLII) at paragraph 8.
  17. a b X (Re), 2017 CanLII 146099 (CA IRB), para. 9.
  18. a b Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 37.
  19. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform Paper, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf>, page 12.
  20. a b BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 25.
  21. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 29.
  22. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 31.
  23. Freeman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 682 (CanLII), para. 25.
  24. a b c Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 38.
  25. a b BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 27.
  26. Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1296 (CanLII), para. 8.
  27. Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 14.
  28. Mohammed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1038 (CanLII), para. 7.
  29. Alomari v. Canada (Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism), 2015 FC 573 (CanLII), para. 15.
  30. Berger, Max, Canadian Bar Association Immigration Essentials Presentation, 2013, Montreal Quebec CBA Immigration Conference, <http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/pdf/imm13_paper_berger.pdf>, page 26.