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In philosophy, the distinction between truth and opinion[1] is well recognised. However, there are situations where the contradiction between these two concepts can be disregarded, and where opinions are imperative. In Plato's Menon[2], Socrates, one of the main initiators of Ancient Philosophy, argues that although truth and opinion are neatly distinct and dissimilar from one another, opinions can be true. All opinions are not fallacious, and they are not to be neglected, especially when they have the ability to promote action. Indeed, in some fields, such as politics, morality or ethics, it is impossible or difficult to decry a demonstrable, definitive and absolute truth; but sometimes you need to take a position on certain issues and, in order to do so, you may be compelled to rely on an opinion, or personal evaluations. In the Menon, Socrates indulges in resorting to what he calls a "right opinion" (p.359-365) when failing to define virtue and underlines its legitimacy in this particular case: since there is no such thing as an absolute definition of virtue and of how it should manifest itself in every culture and for every one of us, the only way we can try and lead a virtuous life is by following our believed definition of that ideal value. Socrates gives a pragmatic example to illustrate his point: if someone is headed to Larissa[3] and already knows the way to get there, he will surely be able to guide others there; but if someone has a correct intuition of the route to take, he will be a just as good guide as the first one. "Right opinions", "orthè doxa" in Greek, lead to the same outcome as Science does, in fine: from a practical point of view, the rectitude of the action is not compromised but rather identical. In that sense, it has the same value as well-proved scientific truths or knowledge. Therefore, for the question of virtue, if it is impossible to rely upon a scientifical assessment, we can at least discern "right opinions", which can even take the name of "true opinions"(p.359). However, "right opinions" do not have the same status as knowledge: the relationship between truth and a "right opinion" remains contingent, whereas the relationship between Science and truth is necessary[4]. What a "right opinion" lacks before being able to be called a truth, is the cause-effect pattern that human reason carries out to establish truthful statements. If we follow Plato's and Socrates' ways of thinking, we can affirm that truthful things do not necessarily imply primer knowledge and that there are many areas of thought where truth is impossible to be found in an absolute impersonal form. Those cannot be taught, but are personally conceived, thanks to some sort of common sense or through the act of anamnesis.


Most mathematical demonstrations and assumptions are built on statements already taken to be true which are called axioms. In that sense, the Scientific approach to truth is rather different to the philosophical approach: Philosophy seeks to attain objective truth, it is its constant aim, a transcendental and insatiable search, and not its starting point. Indeed, in Philosophy, the distinction between truth and opinion[5] is well recognised. However, there are situations where the contradiction between these two concepts can be disregarded, and where opinions are imperative. In Plato's Menon[6], Socrates, one of the main initiators of Ancient Philosophy, argues that although truth and opinion are neatly distinct and dissimilar from one another, opinions can be true. All opinions are not fallacious, and they are not to be neglected, especially when they have the ability to promote action. ndeed, in some fields, such as politics, morality or ethics, it is impossible or difficult to decry a demonstrable, definitive and absolute truth; but sometimes you need to take a position on certain issues and, in order to do so, you may be compelled to rely on an opinion, or personal evaluations. In the Menon, Socrates indulges in resorting to what he calls a "right opinion" (p.359-365) when failing to define virtue and underlines its legitimacy in this particular case: since there is no such thing as an absolute definition of virtue and of how it should manifest itself in every culture and for every one of us, the only way we can try and lead a virtuous life is by following our believed definition of that ideal value. What a "right opinion" lacks before being able to be called a truth, is the cause-effect pattern that human reason carries out to establish truthful statements. If we follow Plato's and Socrates' ways of thinking, we can affirm that truthful things do not necessarily imply primer knowledge and that there are many areas of thought where truth is impossible to be found in an absolute impersonal form. Those cannot be taught, but are personally conceived, thanks to some sort of common sense or through the act of anamnesis.In that sense, opinions can help build truth and promote action. In a way, Art can also be a starting point, a mirror from which we can recognize ourselves, and can guide us to the truth of ourselves.

==Notes==

  1. "Opinion: acceptance of a proposition despite a lack of the conclusive evidence that would result in certain knowledge of its truth." (Garth Kemerling. Philosophy Pages. A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names. Available from: http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/o.htm#opin[Accessed 18th October])
  2. (1) W. R. M. Lamb, T. E. Page (ed.), A. Post (ed.) W. H. D. Rouse (ed.), and E. Capps (ed.), E. H. Warmington (ed.), Menon, Plato (with an English translation), IV, Harvard University Press, The Loeb Classical Library, England, William Heinemann, 1962, p.359-367
  3. City of the Thessaly region in Greece
  4. "Necessary truth is a feature of any statement that it would be contradictory to deny. (Contradictions themselves are necessarily false.) Contingent truths (or falsehoods) happen to be true (or false), but might have been otherwise." (Garth Kemerling. Philosophy Pages. A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names. Available from: http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/n.htm[Accessed 18th October])
  5. "Opinion: acceptance of a proposition despite a lack of the conclusive evidence that would result in certain knowledge of its truth." (Garth Kemerling. Philosophy Pages. A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names. Available from: http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/o.htm#opin[Accessed 18th October])
  6. (1) W. R. M. Lamb, T. E. Page (ed.), A. Post (ed.) W. H. D. Rouse (ed.), and E. Capps (ed.), E. H. Warmington (ed.), Menon, Plato (with an English translation), IV, Harvard University Press, The Loeb Classical Library, England, William Heinemann, 1962, p.359-367