User:RekonDog/Sandbox/Abrahamic Philosophy & Science/Appendix VI

This list of categories given in the al-Qatighuriyas wa Tubiqa is not exhaustive or final.

Categories

Substance

(Greek: ousia, essence or substance |Arabic jauhar, q.v.). Substance is that which cannot be predicated of anything or be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates.

Quantity

kamm, q.v.; (poson, how much). This is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period. Examples: two cubits long, number, space, (length of) time. quality (kaif, q.v.)

Quality

kaif, q.v.; (poion, of what kind or quality). This determination characterizes the nature of an object. Examples: white, black, grammatical, hot, sweet, curved, straight.

Relation

’idafah, q.v.; (pros ti, toward something). This is the way one object may be related to another. Examples: double, half, large, master, knowledge.

Place

aina, q.v.; (pou, where). Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Examples: in a marketplace, in the Lyceum.

Spatial–Temporal

mata, q.v.; (Greek: pote, when). Position in relation to the course of events. Examples: yesterday, last year.

Situation (or Position)

wad‘, q.v.) (keisthai, to lie). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’, ‘standing’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied. Others read: posture, attitude.

State of condition

jiddah, q.v.; (echein, to have, to be, in a state or condition). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the determination arising from the physical accoutrements of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, to have).

Possession

lahu, q.v.;

Action

fi‘l, also called yaf‘al; (poiein, to make or do). The production of change in some other object (or in the agent itself qua other).

Affection/Passion

’inf‘al and anf‘il; (paschein, to suffer or undergo). The reception of change from some other object (or from the affected object itself qua other). Aristotle's name paschein for this category has traditionally been translated into English as "affection" and "passion" (also "passivity"), easily misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to affection as an emotion or to emotional passion. For action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ His examples make clear that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive voice — as acting is to being acted on.