Transportation Economics/Revenues

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Revenue and Financing


Contents

[edit] Logrolling

Logrolling and vote trading are ubiquitous aspects of public financing of infrastructure. They are also essential because simple majority decisions say nothing about the intensity of preferences. Yet when allowed to proceed too far, they create other inefficiencies -- there is a finance externality. Logrolling is only significant when minority feelings are more intense than the majority's, otherwise the majority prevails anyway.

TE-Revenues-Logrolling.png

Following Buchanan and Tullock, Imagine a simple logrolling model where improvements are determined by referenda.

Imagine N farmers, each on cul-de-sac like roads A, B, and C, off of a Major Road.

  1. Each referendum to repair a single road, paid by all fails, farmers on roads B and C won't vote for A, etc. --- Non-Cooperative
  2. Kantian road service standards, when in need of repairs, any road below some threshold gets repaired --- Cooperative, may require a "Constitutional Arrangement"

Formula are possible in a narrow domain such as road repair, but much harder when comparing between domains (roads vs. education).

[edit] Financing Mechanisms

  1. Statute labor, or the corvee, working out the road tax
  2. Donations
  3. Private subscriptions
  4. Assessments on adjacent property
  5. Tolls
  6. Fines for failure to perform statute labor
  7. Public lotteries
  8. Public land sales
  9. Military Funds
  10. Taxes

(Railroads have financed with 3, 5, 7, 8 and some public subscription. Public land sales were particularly important)

[edit] History

In the 1790s, Lancaster Pike was the first significant turnpike in the US. In 1808, Gallatin posited that it was legitimate for government to finance roads. Only roads with reasonable returns should be built, but effective transportation is vital to the national defense.

The Federal Road of Act of 1916 established formula funding, the state highway organization, and the relative roles of government.

[edit] Public Role in Private Sector

Traditional

  • Private contributions - $, in kind

Facilitator

  • Planning (Government coordination)
  • Matching private $ affect government grants
  • State as Broker

Investor

  • State as stockholder in private investment
  • Transportation corridor development corporation
  • State as developer

[edit] Private Role in Public Sector

e.g. Highways

  • Design
  • Build
  • Operate (Lease to city for tax advantages?)
  • Transfer
  • Maintain

[edit] Financing

Taxes relating to transportation

  • Tax increment financing (Bonds issued against increment)
  • Value Capture Districts (% increase in assessed value due to accessibility)
  • Exactions and impact fees (proportionate to infrastructure or congestion created)
  • Proffers
  • Regulation with loopholes

Incentives to build infrastructure

  • Tax Exempt Bonds
  • Regulatory Exemptions
  • Government Backed Bonds
  • Eminent Domain

Alternative Private Ownership of Infrastructure

  • Toll Road
  • Local "Club"/Private Driveways

[edit] Cost Allocation Study

Highways

Passenger Vehicles 93% of Travel miles, 64% of costs

Combination Trucks 5% 25%

weight distance tax would improve equity in the system and efficiency

Over Pay

  • Pickups and Vans
  • 2-axle trucks

Under Pay

  • cars, 3 axle-trucks, tractor trailers
  • Buses

[edit] Transit Allocation

Transit 1997 Fares total $7.126 Billion,

Total Operating Funds, $17.931 Billion

Unlinked Trips 7.954 Billion

-> approximately $1 fare, $3 average cost, marginal cost probably less.


[edit] Financing Local Transportation Infrastructure

Disbursements for highways Minnesota 
($ in '000)

Category State (1997) Local (1996)
Capital 558,716 724,807
Maintenance 268,519 443,418
Administration 146,587 220,608
Interest 4,484 49,586
Bond Retirement 12,785 194,313
Grants in Aid to Locals/Payments to State 459,304 36,934
TOTAL 1,450,395 1,669,666

[edit] Revenue for Highways in Minnesota

Category State (1997) Local (1996)
Motor Fuel Taxes 519,456 0
Vehicle Carrier Taxes 526,619 0
Federal FHWA 304,899 0
Federal Other 4,749 4,045
General Fund 0 430,700
Property Tax 0 399,416
Miscellaneous 66,647 55,424
Bond Proceeding 603 177,962
Local Governments/Payment from State 29,103 604,962
TOTAL 1,452,076 1,672,509

Notes:

  • No local user tax, no local tolls
  • State doesn't use tolls or general revenues
  • Local Miscellaneous much higher in California
  • Vehicle Tax has gone down since this data out (reduction in vehicle tab)

[edit] Financing Transit

Revenue Category Amount
Operating
Fares 43,698.50
Fare Revenue Returned 3.3
Retired 0
Other Revenue 1,324.50
NonTransportation 791
Dedicated Other 0
UZA Formula 3,377.20
Other Federal 238.1
State General Revenue 0
State Dedicated 206.6
Local General Revenue 20,200.00
Dedicated Other (Local Property Taxes) 56,095.50
TOTAL 125,934.80
Capital
Property Tax 14,203.10
Gas Tax 86.4
Federal Capital Grant 5,173.40
UZA 13,408.90
TOTAL 32,871.80

Metro Transit (1995) From National Transit Database

[edit] Expenses

  • Operating Expenses - $125,000,000 (837 vehicles -> $149,000 / vehicle)
  • Capital Expenses - $33,063,000 (Rolling Stock 23,617,000; Facilities 6,277,000; Other 3,173,000)
Cost Category Unit Cost
operating cost / vehicle revenue hour $75.80
operating cost / vehicle revenue mile $3.30
maintenance cost / vehicle revenue mile $1.10
non-vehicle maintenance / vehicle revenue mile $0.20
general administration / vehicle revenue mile $0.90

[edit] Financing Tools

[edit] Gas Tax

Federal - 18.4 cents/gallon State - 20.0 cents/gallon Range: 8 cents in Alaska to 30.8 cents in Pennsylvania (insert state gas tax table here, or graphic)

[edit] Development Regulation

  • Developer Exactions
  • Impact Fees/Taxes
    • Tend to be for basic services and infrastructure
    • Technically straight-forward
    • Legal Basis
    • Minimize Cost to Developers
    • Cost Sharing
  • Negotiations and Proffers
  • Development Districts
  • Road Clubs

[edit] Transit Operators

    • See Cervero - Rail Transit and Joint Development
  • Air Rights Leasing
  • Benefit Assessment Districts
  • Connection to Transit Charges

History of railroad and checkerboard pattern of development of American West

[edit] Other Financing Tools

  • Local Option Gas Tax,
  • Local Option Sales Tax
  • Toll Roads, (Orange County, CA is building network)
  • VMT (Odometer) Tax
  • Private Roads

[edit] The Choice Between Taxes and Tolls

(Ref: Levinson () Why States Toll: 
An Empirical Model of Finance Choice)


[edit] Research Question

States can impose tolls, yet not all do.

  • What are the explanatory factors?
  • How significant are they?
  • What would happen if transportation powers were decentralized to metro areas or counties?

[edit] Hypotheses

  • Share of Toll Revenue Can be Explained by:
  • Non-Resident Workers (+)
  • Neighboring States’ Policies (+)
  • Historical Factors (Miles of Toll Road before Interstate Era) (+)
  • Perceptions of Toll Incidence
  • Toll Incentives

TE-Revenues-Incidence.png

' ' Workplace '
In (D) Out (B)
Residence In (C) Local (Resident Worker) Exported Labor
No incentive to toll Small incentive to toll
Out (A) Imported Labor (Non-Resident Worker) Through
Medium incentive to toll Large incentive to toll

[edit] Data by State

' Percentage ' ' ' Miles '
STATE Revenue from Tolls (S) Workers Who Live Out of State (O) Residents Who Work Out of State Federal Land Toll Roads in 1963 Freeways, Expwy, 1995
Alabama 0 2.4 3.6 3.3 0 925
Arizona 0 1.1 1.6 41.5 0 1250
Arkansas 0 4 3.2 8.3 0 646
California 2.1 0.5 0.4 44.6 0 3750
Colorado 0.3 0.8 1 36 17 1170
Connecticut 0 4.6 4.7 0.2 194 542
Delaware 25.3 13.8 9.5 2.2 11 51
Florida 7.8 0.8 1 7.6 207 1861
Georgia 0.4 2.8 2.4 3.9 11 1413
Hawaii 0 1 0.5 8.5 0 77
Idaho 0 2.6 4 60.6 0 613
Illinois 9.3 2.8 2.9 1.3 185 2245
Indiana 4.3 3.3 4.8 1.7 157 1303
Iowa 0.1 3.7 4.3 0.2 0 781
Kansas 6.5 7.1 7.6 0.5 241 1008
Kentucky 0.8 6.3 6.7 4.2 205 855
Louisiana 2.9 2.1 1.9 2.8 0 929
Maine 10.5 2.1 3.1 0.9 112 383
Maryland 7 7 17.3 3.1 42 711
Massachusetts 10.4 5 3.1 1.2 124 762
Michigan 0.7 0.8 1.5 10.1 0 1458
Minnesota 0 2.3 1.8 3.1 0 1042
Mississippi 0 3.1 5.9 4.3 0 726
Missouri 0.1 7.2 4.8 3.8 0 1460
Montana 0 0.8 1.2 27.5 0 1190
Nebraska 0.2 4.3 2.3 1.2 0 497
Nevada 0 4.3 1.2 77.1 0 586
New Hampshire 11.8 8.5 16.8 12.8 77 266
New Jersey 27.3 7 11.7 3.3 309 728
New Mexico 0 1.9 2.5 33.9 0 1003
New York 33.2 5.1 2.4 0.7 629 2328
North Carolina 0.1 2.2 1.8 6.9 0 1237
North Dakota 0 5.9 3.7 4 0 570
Ohio 3.3 2.8 2.2 1.1 241 1937
Oklahoma 7.6 1.1 2.9 1.5 174 1064
Oregon 0.5 3.7 2.1 51.8 0 780
Pennsylvania 11.7 3.4 4.3 2.2 469 2087
Rhode Island 3.7 7.6 11.9 0.7 0 137
South Carolina 0 2.1 1.8 3.8 0 894
South Dakota 0 3 4 5.5 0 681
Tennessee 0 4.6 3.3 5.7 0 1176
Texas 2.5 0.9 0.8 1.4 30 4474
Utah 0.1 1 1.3 63.1 0 948
Vermont 0 4.9 5.8 6.4 0 1329
Virginia 4.7 6.5 9.3 9.4 35 339
Washington 4.1 1.5 2.7 24.1 0 1079
West Virginia 6.6 8.3 9.7 7 86 560
Wisconsin 0 1.4 3.2 5.3 0 830
Wyoming 0 2.6 2 48.5 0 916

Correlations Matrix

' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
Toll Share (S) Population (P) Toll Mile 1963 Imported Workers Neighbor Effect (N) Land Density Federal Land (%)
Toll Share (S) 1
Population (P) 0.27 1
Toll Mile 1963 0.71 0.39 1
Imported Workers (O) 0.49 -0.27 0.16 1
Neighbor Effect (N) 0.61 -0.03 0.36 0.54 1
Land -0.32 0.36 -0.22 -0.5 -0.45 1
Density 0.53 0.18 0.39 0.39 0.7 -0.48 1
Federal Land (%) -0.28 -0.07 -0.32 -0.29 -0.22 0.45 -0.32 1

[edit] Results

' Model 1 ' Model 2 '
Coefficients t Stat Coefficients t Stat
Intercept -0.03 -2.42 ** -0.036 -2.51 **
Population (P) (millions) 0.00383 3.20*** 0.00386 3.15***
Mile Ratio (M) 0.3 4.13*** 0.35 5.25***
Imported Workers (O) 0.85 2.92 ** 0.84 2.85 **
Neighbor Effect (N) 89877 1.71 *
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.81 0.79
R Square 0.65 0.63
Adjusted R Square 0.62 0.6
Standard Error 0.04 0.05
Observations 49 49
F 20.87 25.76
Significance F 0 0

[edit] Conclusions

  • Finance Choice depends on (positively) cross-border flows, neighboring state tolls, historical use of tolls, and population.
  • Devolving power to metropolitan areas is insufficient to achieve significant road pricing.
  • Under radical decentralization tolls may become widespread.